| 小栗上野介（HP東善寺） ●● 小栗上野介・対馬事件 露艦退去の通説を糺す・史跡探訪
Kozukenosuke Oguri (HP Tozenji Temple) ●● Kozukenosuke Oguri and the Tsushima Incident: Redressing the commonly held belief that the Russians left the area and exploring historical sites
|Redressing the common belief about the Tsushima Incident|
| ■小目次 通説を糺す へ 対馬事件の史跡 へ 小栗の濡れ衣 へ 勝海舟の虚言 へ
例： 二月三日は和暦＝漢数字、 ３月13日は西暦、 3月1日は露暦、を表す。
| ■ Table of contents: Redressing the common belief Historical sites of the Tsushima Incident Frame-up of Oguri Falsehood of Kaishu Katsu
■ For calendar days, the Japanese calendar (JC), the Western calendar (WC), and the Russian calendar (RC) are used on this page.
For example, "(JC) February 3" indicates the Japanese calendar, "(WC) March 13" indicates the Western calendar, and "(RC) March 1" indicates the Russian calendar.
Dates are basically based on the Japanese calendar, unless otherwise noted as western or Russian calender.
文久元年（１８６１） 二月三日（ ３月13日、 3月1日）、対馬の浅茅（あそう）湾にロシア軍艦ポサドニク(艦長ビリレフ ビリリョフとも）が船の修理を口実に突然入航、芋崎浦にそのまま居座りを続ける事件が起きた。 反発した島民や農兵とのトラブルから農兵松村安五郎が射殺され、捕われたのを恥じた吉野数之助は舌を噛んで自害するなど、殺傷事件も生じた。艦長ビリレフは船の修理のためという口実から、材木提供や人員資材の提供を要求するようになり、しだいにイギリスの侵入を防いであげるという口実で土地の租借へと要求をエスカレートさせた。対応に苦慮した対馬藩からの報告で、遣米使節から帰国後に外国奉行に任ぜられていた小栗豊後守忠順は、目付溝口八十五郎とともに「見回り＝視察」を命じられて対馬へ向かう。
| What is the Tsushima Incident...?
It was the incident in which the Russian warship Posadnik illegally invaded and stayed in Tsushima.
It was also known as the "Russian warship Tsushima occupation incident," "Posadnik Tsushima occupation incident," "Posadnik incident," and "Russian warship Tsushima occupation incident."
On (JC) February 3, (WC) March 13, or (RC) March 1 of 1861, the Russian warship Posadnik (Captain, Nikolai Alekseevich Birilev) suddenly entered Asō Bay in Tsushima on the pretext of repairing the ship, and continued to stay at Imozakiura.The Russians had trouble with the islanders and farmers, who rebelled against them, and a farmer, Matsumura Yasugoro, was shot to death, and Kazunosuke Yoshino, ashamed of his capture, committed suicide by biting his tongue. Under the pretext of repairing the ship, Captain Birilev began to demand the provision of lumber and manpower, and gradually escalated his demands to the leasing of land on the pretext of preventing the British from invading.
In response to a report from the Tsushima clan, which was struggling to cope with the situation, (Bungonokami*) Tadamasa Oguri, who had been appointed as a foreign magistrate upon his return from the mission to the United States, was ordered to go to Tsushima withYasogoro Mizoguchi, a chief inspector.
* Note: At the time, Tadamasa Oguri was in charge of the Bungo Province, so he was calld "Bungonokami Tadamasa Oguri," but not "Kozukenosuke ...."
|通説を糺す||Redressing the common belief|
| The Origin of the Tsushima Incident and the Truth about the Departure of Russian Ships
- The common belief that British ships were dispatched to evacuate the area is false.-
| Progress of Tadamasa Oguri's Negotiations
・ Oguri arrived in Tsushima on (JC) May 7 and went to the house of Kozo Kameya, a feudal lord near the port where he stayed. Yoshikazu Mune, the lord of the clan, paid a courtesy visit to the house.
・ On (JC) May 10, 14, and 18 of 1861, Oguri met three times with the captain of the Posadnik, Birilev, and demanded that the ship leave, but Birilev replied lazily and did not agree to leave.
・ On (JC) May 20, Tadamasa Oguri and Yasogoro Mizoguchi left Tsushima and returned to Edo.
Historians since the Meiji era have stated that "(Kozukenosuke) Tadamasa Oguri left Tsushima without achieving any success.
However, Oguri must have thought, "Captain Birilev was acting on orders from the Russian Navy's upper echelons. Even if we continue to negotiate with Captain Birilev, who is only the end of the military organization, there is no way the ship will leave as requested. We need to go back to Edo and ask the shogunate to negotiate with the Russian high level and order them to leave." Then, Oguri thought about the future as follows:
(1) The Shogunate should protest and demand evacuation from the more senior levels of Russia through diplomatic negotiations.
(2) Tsushima is likely to be a place for this kind of trouble in the future. Therefore, the Shogunate should give another territory in Kyushu to the Tsushima clan and place Tsushima under the direct control of the Shogunate. Then, if necessary, it could be used as a port of entry to allow foreign ships to call at the port and trade with it, so that Russia alone would not be able to act on its own due to the conflict with other foreign countries.
(3) Before April 6, when Oguri was ordered to Tsushima, the Tsushima clan had been privately hoping for a change of territory to another place in Kyushu, and took the opportunity of the stay of the Russian ship to pass a resolution at the clan residence on March 27.
However, this proposal was not accepted by Nobumasa Ando,a shogunate council member, and Ando tried to get the Russian ship to leave by taking up the British Minister Parks' offer to send British warships. Tadamasa Oguri opposed the idea, saying that it would be like driving out a tiger from the front gate and inviting a wolf to come in from the back gate, and he resigned as foreign magistrate.
As a result... Lieutenant Commander Hope of the British ship Lindove went to the Russian ship and advised Birilev to leave, but the ships still would not leave. If, when the British ships arrived, the Russian warship sneaked away without a fight, after only a theatrical standoff, Birilev would be court-martialed by the Russian Navy for violation of orders and dereliction of duty. In addition, there are still many stories that do not fit in with the dispatch of British ships, such as Kaishu Katsu's encouragement to the British and Russian legations.
Let me conclude by saying that:
1. The Shogunate's protest to the Hakodate consul, Gosikevich, by the Hakodate magistrate, Awajinokami Norimasa Muragaki, that their stay in Tsushima was illegal and in violation of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and Russia, and the shogunate's demand that they leave, was effective.
2. At first, Foreign Minister Gorchakov had told Goshkevich that the stay in Tsushima and the request for the lease of the base were not related to diplomacy, but were the sole actions of the navy, so Goshkevich pretended to be unaware of the stay in Tsushima. However, when he was informed of the Shogunate's request for evacuation and the fact that the foreign diplomatic corps in Edo considered it a problematic action, he had no choice but to sit up and send a recommendation to Admiral Likhachev that it would be better to evacuate the Russian ships from Tsushima.
|It all started with British ships trespassing on Tsushima.|
|◆イギリスの不法行為…1858安政五年の日英条約・日露条約ともに 「外国船は緊急の気象避難以外には定められた港以外に寄港してはならない」 ことが定められている。
| ◆ British Torts... Both the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and the Russo-Japanese Treaty both of 1858 stipulate that "foreign ships shall not call at ports other than those designated except for emergency weather evacuation."
・ In April 1859 (Ansei 6), the British warship Acteon, and in November 1859, the British warships Acteon and Dorf illegally surveyed and the crew landed in Tsushima and climbed Mt. Shiratake.
(Incidentally, Tadamasa Oguri was ordered to be an envoy to the United States in September of that year and the above incidents occurred in April and November of the same year. The following year of 1860 or Ansei 7 (and Man'en 1 from March), he went to the U.S. and traveled around the world, returning to Japan in September.)
The Russians became impatient when they received information about these British ships' movements.
・ Gosikevich, the Russian consul in Hakodate, reported to the Russian Foreign Ministry that the British were trying to contain Russia by holding Tsushima next to China.
・ The Russian envoy in Beijing, Ignatiev (a former army officer), also informed Admiral Ivan Likhachev of the Russian Oriental Fleet that the British were aiming at Tsushima next to China. Likhachev reported this to Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, Minister of the Navy (brother of the Czar).
| ◆ Russia's Illegal Acts
◆ Russian Navy's Policy of Leasing Land under Private Contract
* The Russian Foreign Ministry has taken the position that it is not involved.
1860万延元年 六月二十八日 7月22日、このリハチョフ報告を皇帝の前で披露した海軍大臣コンスタンチンは、対馬に露艦を派遣して居座らせ、既成事実の積み上げで対馬の大名から基地を租借することを提案した。
| On (JC) June 28 (Man'en 1) or (RC) July 22, 1860, Konstantin, the Minister of the Navy of Russia, who presented this Likhachev report in front of the Russian Emperor, proposed to dispatch Russian ships to Tsushima to stay there and to lease the base from the feudal lord of Tsushima by accumulating accomplished facts.
Emperor Alexander II of Russia was concerned about damaging diplomatic relations with Japan.
However, Konstantin said,
"In Japan, it is possible to lease land without any form of diplomatic negotiation as long as the feudal lords of the land agree to it, regardless of the Shogunate."
Then, with the Czar's approval, Konstantin instructed Admiral Likhachev to proceed to Tsushima.
In the eyes of Konstantin, this was an idea that exploited the weakness of the Shogunate's system of granting autonomy to each clan.
| ◆ "In our dealings with the feudal lords... we do not take the form of diplomacy..."
(Directive from Konstantin, the Minister of the Navy, to Admiral Likhachev)
"...The feudal system of the Japanese Empire may help in this matter, in that you may only make friendly deals with local feudal lords or lords without having to deal with the central government. Any negotiations you conduct must never take the form of diplomacy, but must be conducted initially as individual deals between the local government and our fleet. ..."
(JC) June 21, 1860, (RC) July 26 → Received by Likhachev in mid-December
("Russians' View of Japan at the End of the Edo Period," by Kazuya Ito, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2009)
|露国外務省は「高見の見物」||Russia's Foreign Ministry was "watching from a high vantage point."|
| ◆ Why did Navy Minister Konstantin remind Likhachev that "we must never take the form of diplomacy"?
Foreign Minister Gorchakov wanted to oppose it at the Cabinet meeting in the presence of the Czar. His reasons were as follows:
According to the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and Russia,
"No one is allowed to enter Japanese ports except in case of shipwreck or emergency evacuation."
Therefore, this kind of shoddy way of creating a accomplished fact in violation of the treaty and attempting to lease the land is not acceptable. Besides,
1. Daimyo (local lords) cannot handle it alone, and it will cause trouble with the Japanese government (Shogunate)... It will destroy the diplomacy based on trust that has been built up so far.
2. It is quite possible that the Western diplomatic corps stationed in Japan will interfere.
However, the Minister of the Navy, Konstantin, was not only the head of the Navy, but also the younger brother of Tsar Alexander II, and thus had a strong voice in Russian politics. It was difficult for Foreign Minister Gorchakov to oppose the plan head-on, so he skillfully dodged the responsibility that would fall on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by asking that the Navy do it alone, without diplomacy.
In response to this opinion, the Navy Minister, Konstantin, simply said that he would do it without diplomacy, that it would be easier to do it without diplomacy interfering, and that he would do it by the Navy alone. This was at the background of his reminding Likhachev that "we must never take the form of diplomacy."
| ◆ "Building on accomplished facts of the stay ... establishing a base under a private naval contract with the Tsushima clan ... no need for diplomacy ..."
(Letter from Navy Minister Konstantin to Admiral Likhachev)
"Foreign Minister Gorchakov concluded ...... that the issue should not be a diplomatic one, but a purely naval one, and that therefore the matter should be left to you. I, of course, was very pleased with this prospect and immediately agreed that it was better. Therefore, I am writing to you.
This matter must take on the character of a private naval contract, not a diplomatic treaty. The question is whether we can establish a naval base, a free port, on this island. No amount of diplomacy is necessary to achieve this.
There is no one who can do this better than yourself. If you can limit yourself to local negotiations with the Tsushima authorities, it would be better to build up the accomplished facts without any negotiations. ......"
(“Diplomacy with Russia in the First Year of Bunkyu or 1961 and Siebold,” edited by Koichi Yasuda, Okayama University)
| ・ Foreign Minister Gorchakov's concern: In Japan, the country that concluded the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the Navy's idea of a shoddy approach to the lease based on accomplished facts of sitting on the land would surely cause trouble with the Shogunate, and the diplomatic corps of Britain, the United States, France, and other countries would not remain silent. On the other hand, it was difficult to oppose the emperor's brother, Grand Duke Konstantin, Minister of the Navy, head-on in front of the emperor. So he confirmed his position that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have nothing to do with it, and that the Navy should do it alone. In other words, he decided to take a "look on high and see what Konstantin can do."
・ Konstantin, the Minister of the Navy, said that it would be easier if diplomats who complained didn't interfere. If they can build up a solid foundation of credibility with the help of coaxing, threats, and shakedowns, Japan's local lords, such as Daimyo, will soon lend them a little land. He thought he was exploiting the weakness of Japan's feudal system, which left much to the autonomy of each clan. It is likely that he underestimated the diplomatic ability of the Japanese government (Shogunate) and the level of the people and thought that his way of doing things was acceptable. He ordered Likhachev to do it, flattering him saying, "There is no one who can do this better than you yourself."
・ Admiral Likhachev's embarrassment--- The summary of the process is as follows:
* On (RC) May 21, 1859, Admiral Likhachev proposed to Navy Minister Konstantin to lease Tsushima and build a base there.
* In (RC) May and June of the same year, Konstantin, Minister of the Navy, proposed before Emperor Alexander II that warships be dispatched to Tsushima to stay and lease the land. Foreign Minister Gorchakov insisted that diplomacy should be left to the navy alone. Konstantin, the Minister of the Navy, agreed.
* On (RC) July 26 of the same year, Likhachev received a directive from Konstantin: "All negotiations must be conducted in the form of individual deals between the local administration and our fleet at first, not in the form of diplomacy. Then, Likhachev was puzzled.
* He had never imagined that they would have to do this without diplomacy, just the Navy. Can they really pull this off?
* Likhachev perhaps thought, if it didn't go well, he would be blamed for the whole thing. This hesitation on his part led to his own reluctant response while instructing Captain Birilev to proceed to Tsushima.
For example, ...
「事件中に彼は二回しか対馬に来航しておらず、（ ３月２８～２９日と ４月１６～１８日の計３泊５日の滞在）、来航時に行われた対馬役人とのロシア海軍基地の建設や賃借権などについての交渉にも参加しなかった。」
（ビクター・シュマギン「『リハチョフ航海日誌』から読み解く対馬事件」東京大学史料編纂所研究紀要 第２５号 2015年3月）
| ・ Admiral Likhachev's reluctant response
Viktor Shmagin pointed out the following:
"Likhachev seems to have considered the construction of a Russian naval base to be the most important task of the Tsushima campaign, but he did not seem to be very active in fulfilling it."
"He visited Tsushima only twice during the incident on (RC) March 28-29 and April 16-18 and did not participate in the negotiations with Tsushima officials on the construction of the Russian naval base and lease rights.
"After (RC) April 18, he entrusted the operation to Navy Colonel Birilev and took no further part in it until (RC) September 14, when he ordered Birilev to withdraw."
"He occasionally sent other Russian warships to Tsushima, but gave no specific orders to the captain."
(Viktor Shmagin, "The Tsushima Incident as Deciphered from the 'Lihachev Voyage Log,'" Journal of the University of Tokyo, Vol. 25, March 2015)
| The Tsushima Incident happened under the sole control of the Russian Navy Orders
Orders were sent: Konstantin, Minister of the Navy ⇒ Admiral Likhachev, Oriental Fleet ⇒ Captain Birilev, Russian ship Posadnik
| ▲ Captain Nikolai Birilev
"As soon as you send Consul Goshkevich to Hakodate, turn around and go to Tsushima to survey the island's routes and resources. If you need to repair your ship, take advantage of the bay's unobstructed view from the open sea." The instructions were to "build up a base in the name of repair and build up the facts" in a secluded place.
| ◆ Order from Admiral Likhachev to Captain Birilev <Top Secret>
... After sending Consul Goshkevich to Hakodate, go to the Korean Straits and Tsushima without losing time. ... Arrive at the above-mentioned bay as soon as possible, anchor the corvette there, and immediately begin a detailed survey of the shipping routes, starting from this bay, the whole of Tsushima, and both sides of the Korean Straits. Needless to say, don't just limit yourself to surveying the shipping lanes on both sides, but try to gather all the necessary information about the condition and resources of this frontier. There's no need to rush the job, so take care to work out all the details.
If you need to repair your corvette, take advantage of the fact that it is anchored in this beautiful bay, which is completely closed off from the open sea. ...(the following is omitted)....
(“Diplomacy with Russia in the First Year of Bunkyu or 1861 and Siebold,” edited by Koichi Yasuda, (RC) February 2, 1861 in Nagasaki, Japan, confidential)
（外務大臣ゴルチャコフは）この問題を誰に任せてよいかはっきり判らないと言い、イグナチェ フに任せることを欲しないと 断固として言いました。この席で彼はイグナチェフを この問題から解放するように私に願い、この問題を外交問題としてではなく、純粋に海 軍の問題にする、それ故に問題をあなたに一任すると話を結びました。私はもちろん、この 展望を非常に喜び、ベターだとすぐに同意しました
小栗上野介が対馬に派遣されて2週間滞在・３回交渉しただけで江戸に戻ったことを非難するのは当たらない。 五月十四日 ６月９日のビリレフとの第２回めの会談でビリレフは小栗にこう語っている。
| "The avoidance of direct phrases such as "build a base" and "force the lease with pre-existing facts" is probably a foreshadowing so that, if the issue of responsibility arises later, the government can escape by saying, "It was done by the people at the site on their own, and I did not tell them to do it. It is the same way that Japanese yakuza bosses say, "It was done by a young man on his own," or politicians say, "It was done by a secretary."
How to Understand the Tsushima Incident
1. Foreign Minister Gorchakov, Iosif Goshkevich, Consul of Hakodate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev, Minister of Peking, and other officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were all bystanders.
Foreign Minister Gorchakov nailed Navy Minister Konstantin in front of the Czar not to involve Ignatievich, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, and Gosikevich, the consul of Hakodate.
"(Foreign Minister Gorchakov) said that he did not know exactly who to entrust this matter to, and he firmly stated that he did not want Ignatiev to be entrusted with it. At this point he asked me to release Ignatiev from the problem and concluded that the problem would not be a diplomatic one, but purely a naval one, and that he would therefore leave the matter to me. I, of course, was very pleased with this prospect and immediately agreed that it was a good idea."
(Letter from Konstantin, Minister of the Navy to Admiral Likhachev, in “Diplomacy with Russia in the First Year of Bunkyu or 1861 and Siebold,” edited by Koichi Yasuda, Okayama University)
Naturally, Foreign Minister Gorchakov is thought to have instructed Hakodate Consul Goshkevich and Minister Ignatiev in Beijing not to get involved in any Russian naval problems in Tsushima.
2. The Russian Navy acted on its own, and the Foreign Ministry stood by and watched.
The incident occurred at the sole discretion of the Navy: Minister of the Navy Konstantin → Admiral Likhachev → Captain of the Posadnick, Bililev.
3. The Posadnik's captain, Birilev, was in a position where he could not leave the ship at will, as he was sailing and docking on orders.
Captain Birilev was not sailing to Tsushima on his own initiative. He was only the end of a naval organization that had been ordered to come, so in order to get the Russian ship Posadnik out of Tsushima, he had to get an order from the top of this order line to leave.
It is not correct to blame Kozukenosuke Oguri for returning to Edo after being dispatched to Tsushima, where he stayed for two weeks and negotiated three times. The conversation of Birilev and Oguri in the second meeting on (JC) May 14 or (RC) June 9, was that:
Birilev: "I was repairing the ship when I received an order from Admiral (Likhachev) to make a chart while I was there. Besides, Britain and France are also targeting this area, so both countries won't be able to touch us while we're here."
Oguri: "If that's the case, shouldn't the Russian government make a direct request to our government?"
Birilev: "I know that, but I can't give you an answer. I'm sure the Admiral or (Hakodate consul) Goshkevich will tell you more, so please ask them.
("Tsushima in the End of the Edo Period and Britain and Russia" by Seizaburo Hino).
Captain Birilev did not come to Tsushima on his own initiative.
No matter how much he was protested, Birilev was in a position where he could not move unless he received an order from the top to withdraw.
Kozukenosuke Oguri understood this. Moreover, the mission of Kozukenosuke Oguri, the foreign magistrate, was "patrol," and he was not given the authority to negotiate beyond the feudal lord or to make decisions on behalf of the shogunate. He returned to Edo after deciding that more high-level negotiations with Russian diplomats would be necessary to bring about the evacuation.
The common belief that "Kozukenosuke Oguri could not solve the problem and returned to Edo" is wrong.
All warships of any country operate under orders from above. Captain Birilev did not stay in Tsushima on a whim. It is curious that historians so far have failed to take this into account, arguing that the ship could not be evacuated (only through on-the-spot negotiations).
|通説・露艦ポサドニックは「英艦が行ったから退去した」…は誤り||The common belief that the Russian ship Posadnick "left the area because the British ship went there" is false.|
・実際に 露艦ポサドニックが対馬を退去したのはホープの勧告の23日後（ 八月十五日９月７日） である。
| In the past, the theory that "British ships were dispatched to evacuate the Russian ship Posadnick" has been described as if it were a dramatic image of a standoff between warships and the Russian ship backing down.
However, as mentioned above, if Captain Birilev had left without orders from Admiral Likhachev, he would have been court-martialed for abandoning his duty and violating orders.
What actually happened before and after the departure of the Russian ship is shown in the table below, "The Second Half of the Tsushima Incident."
・ It was at the end of June that Admiral Likhachev made up his mind to withdraw from Tsushima after he was informed by the consul in Hakodate, Gosikevich, who had received frequent protests from the Hakodate magistrate, Norimasa Muragaki, about the protests of the Shogunate and the unpopularity and opposition of the Western diplomatic corps in Edo. In other words, the decision to evacuate the Russian ships was made before the British Minister Allcock and the shogunate council member Tadamasu Sakai discussed the dispatch of the British ships.
・ It was on (JC) July 23 or (RC) August 16, 1861 (or Bunkyu 1) that Lieutenant Commander Hope of the British ship Lyndhoven arrived at Tsushima and advised the ship to leave. However, Birilev did not leave.
・ Three days later, on (JC) the 26th of the same month, Admiral Likhachev sent an order to the captain at Tsushima to leave, but he did not do so immediately.
・ The Russian ship Posadnick actually left Tsushima 23 days after Hope's recommendation on (JC) August 15 or (RC) September 7, 1861.
If that's the case, we cannot say "the British ships went there and the Russians left."
リハチョフ提督の退去の決定は七月九日・十日（ 8月14日15日、８月２日・３日） に、江戸でオールコック公使が水野老中に会見提案する以前に既になされている。
３、七月二十三日に対馬に到着した英艦ホープ中将が艦長ビリレフに退去を勧告してもビリレフは応じず、3日後の 二十六日に提督リハチョフの退去命令を受け取りながら、さらに２３日後の 八月十五日に退去している。
| From the above table, we can see that:
1. [At Hakodate] On (JC) June 10, the Hakodate Magistrate, Awajinokami Norimasa Muragaki, protested to Consul Goshkevich against the stay of the Russian ship Posadnik in Tsushima and demanded that she leave. Consul Gosikevich responded that the Foreign Ministry was in the position of a bystander, so he blurted out that he was unaware of such a thing, but since it was clearly a violation of the treaty, he responded that it was "certainly inconvenient" and he would tell the ships to leave.
At this point, Russian diplomacy was set in motion, and the assumption that the Russian Navy was acting independently was broken. It means that , for Admiral Likhachev, it no longer met the conditions of the orders he had been given.
[At Hakodate] After this, on (JC) July 3, (JC) August 5, and (JC) August 10, Hakodate Magistrate Muragaki demanded that Consul Gosikevich evacuate the Russian ships from Tsushima.
2. Admiral Likhachev's decision to evacuate the Russian ships from Tsushima was made at least a week before July 12 or (RC) August 5. Because of the time difference between the preparations to send a ship to Tsushima to send the order and the departure of the ship, Admiral Likhachev's transmission of the order to leave was only three days later than the arrival of the British ship Lieutenant General Hope in Tsushima.
Admiral Likhachev's decision to evacuate the Russian ships from Tsushima had already been made before July 9 and 10, (WC) August 14 and 15, or (RC) August 2 and 3, when Minister Allcock met with Mizuno, a shogunate council member, in Edo.
3. When Lieutenant Commander Hope of the British ship arrived at Tsushima on July 23 and advised Captain Birilev to leave, Birilev did not comply, and even stayed on despite receiving Admiral Likhachev's order to leave three days later on July 26. In the end, the Russian ship did not leave until 23 days later, on August 15.
With this, we can hardly say that "they left because the British ships were sent out." In other words, the common theory "the Russian warships left because the British warships went to Tsushima" is wrong.
4. After meeting with Birilev in Tsushima, Lieutenant General Hope went to the port of Origa and left a letter for Admiral Likhachev, whom he could not see due to Likhachev's absence, advising him to leave. The reason for this was that Hope, like Oguri, judged that an order from the top of the Russian Navy to Captain Bilev to leave was necessary (common sense in the military).
Admiral Likhachev was reluctant from the beginning, but as early as early as (RC) April 22 or (JC) March 25, in a report to the Minister of the Navy Konstantin, he said, "I have done my duty and now I ask you to take steps to reinforce it," and requested the following:
|「当該訓令では、私の交渉は、決して外交交渉の形を取るべきではなく、先ず最初は我が国と現地権力との私的な取引の形で行われるべきである、と命ぜられておりました。かくして、私に課せられた任務は、私の双肩にかかっております限りにおきましては、ほぼ完全に為し終えたと看做すことができるであろう、と存じます。残されましたことは、今までに為した ことを強固にするための方策をお採りいただくことを、殿下にお願い申し上げることだけであろう、と存じます。」「…中央政府との交渉に入るのが遅くなればなるほど、その同意を得ることが困難となるでありましょう。…信任状を与えられた大臣（公使）の派遣の必要を私が確信する理由はまさにそこにあります…」 （ビクター・シュマギン「『リハチョフ航海日誌』から読み解く対馬事件」東京大学史料編纂所研究紀要 第２５号 2015年3月）|| "The order was that my negotiations should never take the form of
diplomatic negotiations, but should first take the form of private transactions
between my country and the local authority. Thus, I believe that I have
almost completely accomplished the task that was assigned to me, that is,
the responsibility that rests on my shoulders. The only thing left to do
is to ask Your Highness to take measures to consolidate what has been done
so far. ... The later we enter into negotiations with the central government,
the more difficult it will be to obtain its consent. ...This is precisely
why I am convinced of the necessity of sending a minister with credentials..."
(Victor Shmagin, "The Tsushima Incident as Deciphered from the 'Likhachev's Logbook'," Bulletin of the Historiographical Institute, the University of Tokyo, No. 25, March 2015)
| If he followed the simple instructions of Konstantin, the Minister of the Navy, who had no knowledge of the situation on the ground, it would eventually be conveyed to the Western diplomatic corps residing in Japan and become a diplomatic issue, and he would be stuck there. Besides, Admiral Likhachev must have seen that he would be the one who would be held responsible.
After that, the situation went in the direction that Admiral Likhachev had feared.
・ The Tsushima clan resisted more than expected and the lease request did not progress.
・ The Shogunate got involved and it became a diplomatic issue, and the consul Goshkevich advised them to leave.
・ The diplomatic corps of various countries in Edo (now Tokyo) also condemned the unjustified stay of the Russian ships in Tsushima.
The first condition instructed by the Minister of the Navy, Konstantin, "Proceed with the agreement as a private contract between the Navy and the Tsushima clan only, and do not make it a diplomatic issue" was no longer met. If he backed out at this point, he would not be held responsible.
The truth of the matter is that Admiral Likhachev issued the order to leave, saying that he had no choice but to leave, just as Hakodate Consul Goshkevich had said.
| Oguri and Awajinokami Norimasa Muragaki opposed the dispatch of British ships
"It is like expelling a tiger from the front gate and inviting a wolf to the back gate."
| Tadamasa Oguri's thoughts were:
(1) The shogunate should protest and demand evacuation from the higher levels of Russia through diplomatic negotiations.
(2) Tsushima is likely to become a place for such international troubles in the future, but the power of a small clan without foreign language interpreters is not enough to deal with it. Since the Tsushima clan has long wanted to change its domain to another part of Kyushu, it would be better to give the Sō family (the lord of the Tsushima clan) another domain in Kyushu and place Tsushima under the direct control of the Shogunate.
(3) If necessary, allow foreign ships to call at and trade with Tsushima as an international port of entry, and Russia alone will not be able to act on its own due to the conflict with other foreign countries.
However, a shogunate council member of the time, Nobumasa Ando, did not accept this proposal, and took up British Minister Parkes' offer to dispatch British warships and tried to get the Russian ships to leave. Oguri opposed this approach, saying that it would be like expelling a tiger from the front gate and inviting a wolf to the back gate, and resigned as foreign magistrate.
Awajinokami Norimasa Muragaki, the Hakodate Magistrate, also opposed the dispatch of British ships, saying that it would be like expelling a tiger from the front gate and inviting a wolf to the back gate. The two former envoys to the United States were unanimous in their views.
|対馬藩宗家の移封（領地替え要望）論 藩が以前から希望していた|| The Tsushima clan, Sō family's request for transfer (change of territory)
The clan has been hoping for transfer for a long time.
…もし万一ロシアの要求通りに租借地を認めたりした場合は、島中の者どもはこれまでのロシア側の仕打ちを怒っており 、その感情をなだめてもとても抑えきれない状況です。またロシアに認めた場合は英仏などの諸国も同様の許可願いが 出て、もう外国のような島になりとてもこれまで通りの経営はなりゆかなくなります。対馬が幕府の直轄地となる場合は、肥 前筑前などの最寄りの土地を移封の地として当てて頂きたい… 日野清三郎『幕末における対馬と英露』）
| [In the Tsushima clan, there was originally an argument for the transfer even before the Russian Warship problem.]
Transfer Theory: The rugged terrain of Tsushima meant that there were few fields, and unusual trade goods such as cotton, silk, and ginseng were very lucrative in the early Edo period, but now that domestic production was sufficient, the lucrative trade in Korea was diminishing. The clan's Edo retainer, Sasu Iori, and others took the lead in this effort.
Opposing Theory: Sō Sukekuni fought bravely to the bitter end during the invasion of Genko (1274), and the clansmen were proud of him and the people of the island have come to trust the Sō family. It would be a shame for the samurai to abandon the islands and go their separate ways just because they are struggling to deal with the Russian ships.
"As soon as the first report to the shogunate about the arrival of the Russian ships arrived at the Edo residence at the end of February, Iori Sasu took the opportunity to promote his argument and immediately sent a courier to Tsushima to explain the necessity of the transfer. In this way, the argument for the transfer of the domain rapidly gained strength in conjunction with the countermeasures against the Russian ships, and was finally adopted as the basic policy of the domain administration at a meeting held at the domain residence on March 28, 1861. ("Tsushima and Britain and Russia at the End of the Edo Period" by Seizaburo Hino)
By summarizing the above, we can say:
The stay of the Russian warship in Tsushima led to a widespread debate at the residence of the Tsushima clan in Edo about the transfer of the feudal domain, and on March 28, a resolution was passed at a meeting of the domain residence as the basic policy of the domain administration (incidentally,Kozukenosuke Oguri was ordered to dispatch to Tsushima on April 6).
After receiving the resolution from the Edo domain office, the Tsushima clan discussed it with the feudal lord. They then delivered a report to the shogunate from its Edo residence, suggesting that they would accept the request if it came with favorable conditions, as if they were saying, “If the shogunate orders the transfer of the land to a new location in order to deal with the Russians, rather than at the request of the Sō family, they have no choice but to comply.”
Later, on June 13 in Tsushima, the feudal lord Yoshiyori Sō sent to Edo an application for the transfer, and submitted it to the shogunate on August 1.
Excerpts and translation of the application:
...If we were to grant the lease as Russia had requested, the people all over the island would be angry at the way Russia had treated them so far, and even if we could appease their emotions, it would be very difficult to control them. If Tsushima was granted to Russia, other countries such as Britain and France would also apply for the same permission, and the island would become like a foreign country, and it would be impossible to manage it as before. In the event that Tsushima is placed under the direct control of the Shogunate, we would like to see the nearest land, such as Hizen or Chikuzen, used as a transfer site...
(“Tsushima in the End of the Edo Period and Britain and Russia” by Seizaburo Hino)
[Kozukenosuke Oguri was falsely accused]
But...there is a theory that Kozukenosuke Oguri forced the Tsushima clan to transfer to another land, but this is a false accusation against Oguri.
"Oguri would lent Tsushima to Russia as a territory directly controlled by the Shogunate and Asō Bay as a military port. ...The Tsushima clan, which would be forced out, would protest strongly, and Choshu, on the other side of the sea, would put up a desperate resistance because trade through Tsushima, which was lucrative, would become impossible......)
This is the reason why
"...Oguri was executed by the government forces, but Oguri had been the cause of his own execution since the Tsushima problem..."
(Excerpt from “Kaishu Katsu and the diplomacy at the end of the Tokugawa shogunate” by Ken’ichi Kamigaito, published by Chukoh Shinsho in 2014)
Here, the author justified the killing of Kozukenosuke Oguri and his followers by the Western forces on completely baseless grounds. Moreover, the killing took place six years later, in 1868 or Keio 4.
◯ As for whether or not Oguri forced Tsushima to transfer, the timeline is as follows:
・ On March 28, the Tsushima clan resolved to request the transfer of its domain as a basic policy of domain administration at a meeting held at its Edo residence.
・ April 6: Kozukenosuke Oguri was ordered to go to Tsushima → Arrived in Tsushima on May 7
The clan had resolved to request the transfer of the land before Kozukenosuke Oguri became involved in the Tsushima Incident, so how can it be that "Oguri forced the transfer"? It is difficult to understand how Oguri could have "forced the transfer" and "(suggested to) lease Asō Bay to Russia" without providing any historical evidence (which may be a guess).
◯ Oguri and his followers were not "executed."
The author uses this frame-up as a basis to justify the Western Army's "murder of Oguri, his son and his eight followers, confiscation of their household goods, selling them off at auction, and using them to finance the army. The word "execution" means to interrogate and clarify the charges. The actions of the "government forces" without interrogation are called robbery and murder.
◇ Errors in the common theories about Kozukenosuke Oguri
◇ The Battle Against Government Consciousness
◇ "Cut down without sin" ... A cenotaph in honor of Kozukenosuke Oguri
|対馬を狙っていた英国||The British Targeted Tsushima|
われわれにとって肝要な点は、疑いもなく対馬島を視界に入れることである。同島はどん な軍艦にも役立つ左右に出口を持ったすばらしい港を持ち、木材や水があり、われわれ を歓迎してくれる住民は、この上なくもてなしがうまい民族で氷に覆われた満州と中国 の絹生産地を結ぶ大そう優雅で重宝なはね橋の役を果たす。
予は露国が着手する数年前に、他の西欧強国が同島に先鞭を著けずして放置したるを奇異 に感ずるものである･･･略…露艦の不法を詰って退去を迫り、若し露艦がこれを拒む場合 は、英国自身がこれを占領すべきである。
| ・ Hodgson, the British Consul in Hakodate, wrote in his "Nagasaki Hakodate Diary" that "Tsushima should be under our control."
◆ Hodgson's "Nagasaki Hakodate Diary"
The essential point for us is, without doubt, to have Tsushima in our sights. The island has a fine harbor with exits on both sides, useful for any warship, wood and water, and the inhabitants who welcome us are a most hospitable people, and serve as a very elegant and useful spring-bridge between the icy Manchuria and the silk-producing regions of China.
Then, he wrote, "Our (Britain's) urgent task is to make Tsushima the island of Perim," likening Tsushima to the small British island of Perim at the outlet of the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and insisting that it be placed under British control.
Perim Island (where the British had a coal storage facility. It is now part of Yemen.)
・ In the midst of the Tsushima Incident, in June, 1861 or Bunkyu 1, the British Minister Allcock also reported to Foreign Secretary Russell that "Britain should control Tsushima."
◆ Report from British Minister Allcock to Foreign Secretary Russell: I find it strange that the other Western powers have left the island unattended for several years before the Russians started work on it... (emission) ...We should blame the Russian ships for their illegality and force them to leave. If the Russians refuse to leave, we should occupy Tsushima ourselves.
In doing so, and even how to do so, he proposes the following. Tsushima is not an uninhabited island, but a territory that is clearly inhabited by Japanese. It's strange that the Shogunate is treating it as a "neglected island," so it should be taken away from the Shogunate and Japan in the following manner..
As a means of doing so, we should force the Japanese government to guarantee the fulfillment of the treaty and open the cities of Osaka and Hyogo to the public, and if they do not agree, Japan should cede Tsushima to us as compensation for the violation of the previous treaty.
(“A Study of the Diplomatic History of the End of the Edo Period,” by Takematsu Otsuka, Hobunkan, 1952)
It was a risky move for Japan to agree to dispatch British ships to Tsushima on the suggestion of the British Minister Allcock, who thought, "If Japan does not accept the opening of the ports of Osaka and Hyogo as we demand, we can take Tsushima as compensation for the violation of the treaty."
If we talk about the violation of the treaty, this incident started from the violation of the treaty by the British, who illegally surveyed and landed on Tsushima twice, once by the British warship Acteon in April 1859, and again by the British warships Acteon and Dorf in November 1859, and climbed Shiratake. The first thing the British should have done was to take responsibility for this violation of the treaty, but they were more interested in blaming others first. It is clear that the diplomats of advanced Western countries at the time were conducting this level of yakuza-like diplomacy as a matter of course.
|■勝海舟の虚言 「氷川清話」 通説の誤り
勝海舟の「彼をもって彼を制す」講談社文庫 or「外交の秘訣」幕末維新史料叢書２・人物往来社 or 「ロシアの侵略主義」角川文庫 …はいずれも勝海舟の虚言
| ■ The Falsehoods of Kaishu Katsu "Hikawa Seiwa": Errors in the common theories
* Since "Hikawa Seiwa" is a part of the discourse by Kaishu Katsu, the part that talks about the Tsushima Incident differs depending on the editor and the publisher as explained below. Kaishu Katsu's "Conquring a man by using another man," Kodansha Bunko, "Secrets of Diplomacy," Bakumatsu Ishin Shiryo Sosho 2, Jinbutsu Oraisha and "The Aggression of Russia," Kadokawa Bunko ... are all falsehoods of Kaishu Katsu.
１、勝海舟が頼んだとすると、それはいつか… 「 」内の青文字は勝海舟の言葉
| ・ There is a discourse on the resolution of the Tsushima Incident in "Hikawa Seiwa" by Kaishu Katsu as follows:
◆ Kaishu Katsu's "Hikawa Seiwa"
"Now here we are, and this is where a diplomat's skills come into play."
With these words, Kaishu Katsu says that he secretly asked Allcock, the British minister in Nagasaki, whom he had been close to, to contact the Russian minister directly from the British minister stationed in Beijing. And about this, Katsu said,
"For no reason at all, I made the Russians leave Tsushima very easily.... This is what is called conquring a man by using another man.” (Hikawa Seiwa)
To be sure, let me confirm the above story of Kaishu Katsu as follows:
 The story goes that Allcock, the British minister in Nagasaki, contacted the British minister in Beijing and had him negotiate with Ignatiev, the Russian minister in Beijing, and as a result, the Russian warships were evacuated from Tsushima, or in other words, they were evacuated through diplomacy alone.
Some historians believe this story that Kaishu Katsu tells so well, and it has developed into a story that is mixed up with other historical fact, and it has become a common belief. In other words, the following historical fact was attached to the story.
 Since Nobumasa Ando, a shogunate council member, accepted the British minister's proposal, the British warship went to Tsushima to advise the Russian warship to leave (but the Russian warship refused). As a result, it end up with a jumbled story that:
 "Kaishu Katsu successfully lobbied the British warship to evacuate the Russian warship."
・ In light of the following historical facts, it is no wonder that Katsu's words can be called lies that were added after the fact.
1. If Kaishu Katsu had asked for it, when would it have been.
(Blue letters in parentheses in the following sentences are Kaishu Katsu's words.)
Allcock, "the British minister in Nagasaki at the time," left Nagasaki on April 23, 1861, two and a half months after the Tsushima Incident occurred on February 3, walked to Shimonoseki, then traveled to Hyogo (by ship) , and walked along the Tokaido to arrive in Edo on May 27.
Therefore, Katsu's approach to Allcock must have been before April 23, when Allcock was still in Nagasaki. "If Allcock easily made the Russian warships leave Tsushima," the matter would have been settled in a few months at most.
However, there is no evidence that Allcock acted on this issue before he proposed the dispatch of British ships at the meeting with Nobumasa Ando, a shogunate council member, on July 9 (during his stay in Nagasaki).
Also, if, as Kaishu Katsu says, in April, Allcock, the British minister in Beijing, and then Ignatiev, the Russian minister in Beijing, had worked together to solve the problem "with the skill of diplomats...very easily," there would be no need for Allcock, the British minister, to make another proposal to the Shogunate on July 9, five months later, to dispatch warships.
2. It is said that Kaishu Katsu "asked Allcock for it in secret," but this is a convenient story for Katsu because there is no need for him to prove or now way for us to refute it.
First of all, Katsu was not present at the meeting between Allcock, the British Minister, and Nobumasa Ando, a shogunate council member, in Edo on July 9. At the meeting, Allcock protested against the shogunate's custom of having a chaperon present during negotiations with foreigners, and even had the chaperon leave the room. Therefore, the theory that "Kaishu Katsu was secretly behind the folding screen" does not hold water.
We should not trust people who use "secrecy" and "top secret" to conveniently develop their own theories about history.
3. Differences in resolution... In historical fact, Lieutenant Commander Hope of a British warship advised Captain Birilev of the Russian warship to leave Tsushima (but Birilev did not leave).
In Kaishu's story (mentioned above in  ), British Minister Allcock, who was secretly asked by Katsu, talked to the British Minister in Beijing, then talked to Russian Minister Ignatiev in Beijing, and by diplomacy alone, "made the Russina warship leave Tsushima very easily."
This is inconsistent with the historical fact that Allcock proposed the dispatch of British ships to Nobumasa Ando, a shogunate council member, received Ando's approval, and dispatched them to Tsushima. Also, if the issue had been resolved through diplomacy alone, as in the story of Kaishu Katsu, there would have been no need to dispatch British ships, and therefore Allcock would not have proposed it to Nobumasa Ando.
Note: There is also a theory  that Katsu Kaishu asked British Minister Allcock to dispatch warships, but it can be regarded as one of the "Katsu Kaishu myths" that conveniently attach other stories and make Kaishu Katsu take credit for everything.
4. The Russian Foreign Ministry was a bystander: As already mentioned, the Russian navy was acting on its own to keep the Russian ships from invading Tsushima, and the Russian Foreign Ministry was basically in the position of a bystander. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that the problem could have been solved by simply talking to Ignatiev, the Russian minister in Beijing. Foreign Minister Gorchakov was opposed (in front of the Czar) to involving Ignatiev, the Russian Minister to Beijing, in this issue. (Since he objected to it, he must have nailed the Minister Ignatiev and the consul in Hakodate, Gosikevich, not to intervene in the Tsushima affair.)
◆ Letter from Konstantin, Minister of the Navy, to Admiral Likhachev
Foreign Minister Gorchakov said that he did not know exactly whom to entrust with this problem and was adamant that he did not want Ignatiev to handle it. At this meeting he asked me to release Ignatiev from the problem and concluded that the problem would not be a diplomatic one, but a purely naval one, and that he would therefore leave the matter to you. I was of course very pleased with this prospect and immediately agreed that it was a good idea.
(“Diplomacy with Russia in the First Year of Bunkyu or 1861 and Siebold,” edited by Koichi Yasuda, Okayama University)
In recent years, the following theory has emerged, as if to reinforce the myth of Kaishu Katsu:
"Ignatiev is a minister with plenipotentiary powers and has military command authority. He can order Admiral Likhachev to leave."
(“Kaishu Katsu and the diplomacy at the end of the Tokugawa shogunate” by Ken’ichi Kamigaito, Chuko Shinsho, 2014)
However, when Admiral Likhachev was appointed as the commander of the Combined Fleet in Chinese waters, the following instructions were issued to give him full authority.
"I entrust you with the command of the fleet which is to be assembled in Pechersky Bay (Bohai Sea or Bay) and which will be under the command of our Minister in Beijing, Army Major General N. Ignatiev." "In case of urgent decisions which cannot be foreseen from this instruction, you should not hesitate to choose the best course of action."
(“Documents of Likhachev's Chinese Fleet as Historical Documents on Russo-Japanese Relations” by Vladimir S. Sobolev," with illustrations of the directive)
Therefore, the above (“Kaishu Katsu and the diplomacy at the end of the Tokugawa shogunate” by Ken’ichi Kamigaito) does not hold water.
Moreover, Ignatiev, the Russian Minister in Beijing, was basically the one who reported to Admiral Likhachev that the British was targeting Tsushima, and it can be said that this incident itself started from Ignatiev's report. And yet, if Ignatiev had simply agreed to leave because the British minister said so, as Katsu Kaishu said, he would have been an incredibly unscrupulous "person to stir up trouble in order to gain the credit for solving it." It's an impossible story.
5. Chain of command from the Minister of the Navy... The reason why Birilev, the captain of the Russian ship, did not leave immediately even after the Tsushima clan members, Kozukenosuke Oguri, and Lieutenant General Hope of the British ship advised him to leave was because he was at the end of the military organization where he could not move without an order from his superior Admiral Likhachev to withdraw. If Birilev had left, saying "I left because the British ship was coming," he would have been court-martialed for violating orders. Without recognizing this fact, conventional historians have assumed that "Kozukenosuke Oguri returned to Edo without achieving anything," which can only be regarded as an indeterminate view.
6. Kaishu Katsu's request to the "wolf at the back gate" was a dangerous overstepping of his authority:
As already mentioned, Minister Allcock even proposed the method of occupying Tsushima, saying that "Britain should occupy Tsushima before Russia does." Therefore, if Katsu really took the liberty of asking the dangerous Allcock, whom he was "close to," "in confidence," it would not have been just a hoax, but a rash and dangerous overreach.
7. Report from Admiral Likhachev to Navy Minister Konstantin: In December of the same year (after the Russian Warship's departure in August), Admiral Likhachev wrote to Navy Minister Konstantin as follows:
"The negotiations, which should have proceeded under a private contract between the Russian Navy and the Lord of Tsushima, shifted to diplomatic soil, which the Russian government did not want...so we had the Posadnik pulled out of Tsushima due to the hindrance."
This report does not mention the names or interventions of Allcock, the British Minister in Japan, or Ignatiev, the Russian Minister in Beijing, as Katsu Kaishu claims.
Kaishu Katsu would not have expected such official documents from the Russian side to appear later in his life, and if he were still alive, he would have panicked and said, "I shouldn't have said that."
| ◆ For more information, please see Taiken Murakami's "Visiting the Historical Sites of the Tsushima Incident," which appeared in the journal of the Society Honoring Kozukenosuke Oguri,"Tatsunami" No. 38-41.
* Correction: The sub-heading in "Tatsunami" No. 38, which does not correspond to the purpose of this page, "Russian ships retreat under pressure from British ships," was a common belief at the time of insufficient research. It has been corrected to read "Retreat of the Russian ships."
Historic Sites of the Tsushima Incident
Kozukenosuke Oguri's Historic sites of the Tsushima Incident
芋 崎（いもざき） ２０１３平成２５年２月１２日
Visiting the Place where the Russian Warship Posadnik anchored
February 12, 2013
The monument "The Ruins of Russian Invasion in the Year of Bunkyu 1 (1861)" at Imozaki
Inscription on the back: Erected in February 1928
The Society for visiting Kozukenosuke Oguri's Historic Sites
The upper part of the drawing on the right is the entrance to Aso Bay from the Korean Strait, called "Oguchi." The Russian ship Posadnik entered from Oguchi and anchored at Osaki on the left side, and after surveying the area, it went around Imozaki, on the lower part of the drawing, where she appeared to be sitting.
Now the buildings have been torn down, and only a well and a stone monument that reads "the Ruins of Russian Invasion" indicate the location of this historical site. Most of the islanders are not interested in this place.
Material provided by Mr. Tsuyosi Komatsu
In November 1993, Mr. Komatsu searched for the monument from the sea in his friend's outboard motor boat, and finally found it among the trees. He wrote about his joy at that time in his book "Hen-yo (A remote and important place)" as follows:
Near the center of the beach, an angular stone peeked out from the thicket. "It could be that one! Faster, faster!" As we approached the beach, the outboard motor groaned, my body twisted, my left hand desperately grabbed the boat's edge, and I sat upright. As we approached the beach, the words "Russian Invasion" appeared clearly. I shook hands with my friend, shouting, "We've found it, we've found it, ..."
▲ The entrance to Imozaki: We started walking from here. At the entrance, there was a signboard erected by the Association for Preservation of Nature and Culture. We started walking with local guide Tsuyosi Komatsu.
▲ Signboard: After a gentle climb, there is a signpost at the corner of the road.
▲ The guideposts were placed at key points along the path. We walked through the fallen leaves. Mr. Komatsu has a deep knowledge of the island's history and has written several books, so his stories are diverse and interesting.
▲ The junction with the signpost to the Imozaki gun battery ruins. The battery was built in preparation for the Russo-Japanese War.
▲ From here, the road started to descend,...
.. and near the coast, it descended even more steeply down the road.
We walked down the road that was built by the Russians.
▲ The Well the Russians dug: When we arrived at the Imozaki beach, the first thing we noticed was a well dug by the Russians. It was filled with water and was still useful.
▲ The Russians took the liberty of cutting down lumber and building quarters, and demanded that carpenters be dispatched and that food be provided.
The coast was covered with garbage from Japan, Korea, and China.
▲ The back of the monument: It says, "Built in March 1927." Until then, it was an empty place and people rarely visited it. The tip of Imozaki can be seen beyond.
▲The Russians built barracks on the beach 400 to 500 meters away. When they left, the Tsushima clan immediately dismantled them, so nothing remains.
Imozaki survey map: A nautical chart of the Imozaki-ura area surveyed by the Russian ship. The Posadnik was sitting in the lower right inlet of the narrow Imozaki peninsula. To the left is the direction of the entrance to Aso Bay (Osaki).
|ロシア側が居住をはかった芋崎浦 絵図 （右は拡大図） 対馬藩に人夫の派遣を要求して井戸を掘り、兵舎を建て、ロシア旗を掲げた。ポサドニクが退去後、兵舎などは直ちに解体されたが、井戸はそのまま残された。
Drawing of Imozaki-ura, where the Russians tried to settle (the right drawing: enlargement of the left): They requested the Tsushima clan to send men to dig a well, build a barracks, and raised a Russian flag. After the Posadnik left, the barracks and other buildings were immediately dismantled, but the well was left intact.
|ポサドニク号艦長 ビリレフ 対馬藩や小栗忠順の退去要求にのらりくらりの応答をして、居座り続けた ロシア海軍組織の末端人物
The captain of the Posadnik, Birilev: He was a terminal figure in the Russian naval organization who continued to stay in the area, responding lazily to the Tsushima Clan and Tadamasa Oguri's requests to leave.
Mt. Shiratake (519m): The Russians called the distinctive mountain shape "donkey ears" and used it as a landmark during the Russo-Japanese War.
What the Russians Left Behind
Kan'emon Shimoda, a close apprentice of Yoshiyori So, the lord of Tsushima domain, received these gifts from Captain Birilev, and Shimoda presented them to the lord. After the death of Yoshiyori So in 1889, his son Shigemasa brought them to the island from Tokyo and presented them to the descendants of the Shimoda family. (Private collection, photo copied)
|立体眼鏡 右の写真を差し込み、双眼でのぞくと立体的に見えるらしい。 ロシアの街や女性、女性のヌード姿などがある。箱書きに入手の来歴が書かれている。
3D glasses: The photos on the right is plugged in, and when you look through it with binoculars, it appears to be 3D. There are pictures of Russian cities, women, and women in the nude. The history of the acquisition is written on the box.
Canal of Ofunakoshi
People on boats used to pull their boats across Ofunakoshi, the narrowest land part of the island, but in 1671, the canal of Ofunakoshi was opened to allow direct passage by boat from Aso Bay in the west to the east. A guard post was usually set up to prohibit unauthorized passage.
On April 12, before Oguri and the others arrived in Tsushima, a Russian boat attempted to forcibly row across here, causing trouble with the guardhouse officials and local people who stopped it. As they threw stones and wood at each other, a Russian soldier's pistol shot Yasugoro Matsumura, a farmer, dead.
The canal of Ofunakoshi: Ships can pass from West Aso Bay to the east through the canal.
The monument "Kuchidome-bansho Kobune-aratame Ato (Checkpoint for ships crossing the Ofunakoshi canal)": There was trouble between the guards at the guard post here and the Russians.
Looking east from Aso Bay side
Loyalty Monument HonoringYasugoro Matsumura: Matsumura was shot and killed while trying to stop a Russian boat from forcibly passing through Ofunakoshi. It was erected in 1893 (Meiji 26).
Martyr's Monument Honoring Kazunosuke Yoshino: Yoshino was so ashamed of being captured by Russian soldiers that he bit his tongue and died in anger. It was built in 1909 (Meiji 42).
▲ The site of the residence of Kozo Kameya, a feudal lord, where Tadamasa Oguri stayed. 100-yen shops in Tsushima are now crowded with tourists from Korea.
Remembering the History of Tsushima
Since Tsushima is the island closest to the continent, we can strongly feel that the cultures of India, China, and Korea first entered here and then were carried to other parts of Japan.
Daffodils: It is said that Tsushima is an island where it snow very rarely, so the daffodils were already in bloom when we visited.
▲ On the river wall of the Horikawa River, there is a relief of the Korea missions to Japan, showing how they first landed on this island to realize that they had arrived in Japan.
|▲万松院 歴代藩主を祀る墓が裏山にある 朝鮮国王から贈られた青銅の三具足（左から花器・香炉・燭台）も残る 諫鼓は領主に諫言する時に鳴らす鼓。鳴らないまま鳥が遊ぶ「諫鼓鳥が鳴く」状態は、良い政治が行われていること。
▲ Bansho-in Temple: There are tombs dedicated to successive generations of the Tsushima feudal lord on the hill behind the temple. The three bronze tools (from left to right: vase, incense burner, and candlestick) presented by the King of Korea remain. "Kanko" is a drum that is played to remonstrate with the lord. When the drum is not sounded and the birds sing ("kanko-dori ga naku"), it means that good government is taking place.
▲ Cemetery of Sō family, the feudal lord of Tsushima: The cemetery is lined with stone lanterns, huge cedar trees, and large stone pagodas. You can feel the calm atmosphere.
▲ Tomb of Hoshu Amenomori at Chojuin temple in Tsushima city: He served the Tsushima clan and devoted himself to diplomacy and trade with Korea. He taught that the first thing to do when dealing with Korea was to understand that people and customs differed, and that it was important not to deceive or fight each other.
▲ Tomb of Seizaburo Hino: He is the author of the famous book, "Tsushima and Britain and Russia at the End of the Edo Period." The book was very useful, along with Koichi Yasuda's "Diplomacy with Russia in the First Year of Bunkyu or 1861 and Siebold" at Okayama University, which translated the Russian materials.
▲ Lecture event: In the afternoon of the day we arrived, there was a National Day lecture on Kozukenosuke Oguri. Since the purpose of our visit was to investigate the Tsushima Incident, the lecture was focused on Oguri, and I felt sorry for those who were expecting to hear about the Tsushima Incident.
◆ For more information, please see Taiken Murakami's "Visiting the Historical Sites of the Tsushima Incident," which appeared in the journal of the Society Honoring Kozukenosuke Oguri,"Tatsunami" No. 38-41.
* Correction: The sub-heading in "Tatsunami" No. 38, which does not correspond to the purpose of this page, "Russian ships retreat under pressure from British ships," was a common belief at the time of insufficient research. It has been corrected to read "Retreat of the Russian ships."
◇ Errors in the common theories about Kozukenosuke Oguri